The European Commission is preparing a legal push to force member states to phase out Chinese-made equipment from critical infrastructure, according to a Financial Times report that has rippled through Brussels and Beijing. The draft cybersecurity bill would convert voluntary limits on so-called "high-risk" suppliers—established in the 2020 5G toolbox—into binding EU-wide rules that could bar Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese firms from participating in telecom networks, solar installations and security scanners.
Brussels officials say any mandated removal would be phased in according to assessed risk levels, industry characteristics, cost and the availability of alternative suppliers. The proposal reportedly comes from the Commission’s team charged with technological sovereignty and aims to close what Brussels sees as a patchwork of inconsistent national rules that undermine a single-market response to security concerns.
The move escalates a policy process that has long split EU capitals. Some members—led by Germany and Sweden in earlier years—have already imposed strict limits on Chinese vendors in parts of their networks; others, including Spain and Greece, continue to host such equipment. That divergence is central to the Commission’s argument that voluntary guidance cannot deliver a common standard of trust across the single market.
Practical obstacles, however, are stark. In the solar industry more than nine in ten panels installed in the EU are manufactured in China, making any blanket exclusion politically and economically painful. Telecom operators have warned that outright bans could raise consumer prices, slow network rollouts and increase costs for fixed broadband upgrades at a time when fibre deployment is a priority.
Political pushback is also likely. Member states jealously guard national security prerogatives and have resisted ceding decision‑making authority on suppliers to Brussels. Several major operators in markets such as Spain and Germany have privately resisted stricter measures, and at least one recent Spanish procurement with Huawei proceeded after national officials judged there was no security risk.
Beijing has reacted sharply. Chinese officials have repeatedly demanded evidence for the security claims and warned that administrative exclusion of Chinese firms would violate market and non‑discrimination rules. At a November 2025 press briefing, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson framed forced removal as counterproductive, claiming it would retard technological progress and inflict economic losses on European firms and consumers.
The EU proposal—if advanced as written—would mark a decisive turn from coordination to compulsion in Brussels’ approach to supply‑chain risk. It would force European policymakers to choose between a unified, security‑driven industrial policy and the commercial and political realities of deep integration with Chinese manufacturing capacity. How that balance is struck will shape Europe’s access to affordable infrastructure, the pace of its broadband ambitions, and the broader arc of EU‑China economic relations at a time of intensifying transatlantic alignment on China policy.