China’s ski season is drawing crowds again. The National Sports Administration’s China Ice and Snow Economy Development Report (2025) records 0.35 billion visits in the first month of the 2025–26 season and CNY36.35 billion in spending, up 10% and 6% year-on-year respectively, while inbound visitors rose 66% to about 190,000. Analysts forecast winter leisure and tourism receipts could top CNY450 billion for the season, a vivid indicator of demand for skiing and related travel.
The headline numbers mask a more difficult reality for operators. Although overall traffic and spending are growing, the number of ski venues fell to 914 at the end of 2024, down 21 from the previous year, a small negative signal that nonetheless highlights mounting competition and industry shakeout. Profits are harder to secure than patronage; high fixed costs, short natural seasons and widening value leakage mean that busy slopes do not automatically translate into healthy balance sheets.
A significant structural shift is underway: new indoor facilities and a proliferation of operators are fragmenting demand. As of April 2025, China had 786 outdoor ski sites (down 17 from the prior season) and 79 indoor "real-snow" venues, a surge of 20 sites, or 33.9% year-on-year. Indoor sites—closer to cities, weather-independent and often cheaper once travel costs are counted—are siphoning beginners and family customers who prefer convenience over destination trips.
The cost profile of conventional outdoor resorts compounds the problem. Building and equipping a major ski area requires heavy capital and ongoing maintenance; annual operating costs commonly run into multiple hundreds of millions of yuan. Natural-snow operations generally enjoy only three to five months of reliable heavy use, forcing many resorts to rely on a winter’s receipts to cover year-round costs — a model that is becoming increasingly precarious.
Profitability is further dampened by where the money actually flows. Skiing is a bundled consumer experience, but the most lucrative purchases—high-end gear, private coaching and travel arrangements—often take place outside the resort’s own revenue streams. Many skiers buy equipment from national or international brands and hire freelance coaches, leaving resorts to capture primarily lift tickets, food and lodging. The result is the industry’s most common complaint: lots of customers, little retained profit.
Price pressure from public subsidies and competition deepens the squeeze. Local voucher schemes designed to promote winter sports have helped expand overall demand but have also entrenched price competition among resorts. Operators report discounting of holiday packages; one marquee destination trimmed a two-night ski-and-stay package by roughly CNY100 year-on-year. With secondary spending on food, lodging and retail subject to heavy competition and homogenisation, traditional income streams are brittle.
Customer composition compounds the challenge. Resort managers report that roughly 80% of guests are beginners whose short-term objective is to achieve basic competence; only about half of those convert into the kind of repeat, higher-spend customers that sustain long-term profitability. Catering continuously to large, low-yield entry cohorts demands steady investment in mass teaching and basic services with uncertain payback.
The decade-long strategy of using property development to bankroll ski facilities is also losing traction. China’s real-estate slowdown has undermined the so-called "land-finance" model. The sale last year of six outdoor resorts, including the high-profile Songhua Lake project, by developer Vanke to China Travel Service (Hong Kong) was broadly read as evidence that property-backed returns can no longer make up for weak operating profits. Songhua Lake alone absorbed some CNY40 billion in investment but produced only CNY200–300 million in annual revenue, a mismatch that is unsustainable.
Faced with constricted external funding and fickle winter demand, many operators are pursuing year-round business models. In northern regions, resorts are repurposing slopes and assets for summer uses: a Beijing resort converts to a golf course, Songhua Lake hosts camping and trail-racing and attracted about 320,000 summer visitors in 2024, and the Chongli district has positioned itself as a summer outdoor destination with more than four million summer visitors in 2024. In southern markets, multi-purpose, climate-controlled indoor facilities were designed from the outset for 12-month operations, integrating water parks, grass skiing and other activities.
Four-season ambitions are not a simple revenue-add; they require investment in surface conversion, maintenance, seasonal staff redeployment and marketing, and they bring new operational risks. The crucial test is whether the additional income from off-season activities covers incremental costs and contributes genuine profit, not merely occupancy or headline visitor numbers.
Operators are also reworking labour models to manage seasonal swings in demand. A common approach is to retain a small core of full-time staff while relying heavily on part-time, outsourced and intern labour; one resort reports a full-time to part-time coach ratio of roughly 1:6. Pay structures tilt toward commission, with many coaches receiving about 30% of lesson fees and the remainder shared between resorts and outsourcing partners. Partnerships with sports universities have supplied energetic, social-media-savvy young instructors who appeal to younger consumers, though interns frequently lack full social insurance coverage.
The industry’s current phase is one of consolidation and sophistication. Resorts that can integrate downstream services, secure more stable year-round revenue, and control key high-margin activities such as equipment rental and coaching stand a better chance of surviving. At the same time, investors and local governments must grapple with stranded assets, labour precarity and climate exposure. The skiing boom has shifted from an era of rapid, resource-driven expansion to one in which operating agility, diversified revenue and careful cost control will determine winners and losers.
For international observers the story matters for several reasons. China’s winter-sports market is large enough to shape global equipment brands, tourism flows and the business models of foreign operators. It also offers a revealing case study in how leisure industries adjust to the twin pressures of structural demand shifts and a cooling property market. How quickly and effectively China’s ski sector completes that adjustment will influence manufacturing, regional tourism strategies and the allocation of public support in the years ahead.