On 4 February the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps revealed a subterranean missile facility and unveiled the 'Khorramshahr-4', which it described as an operational, front-line ballistic weapon. State-linked outlets Fars and Mehr published footage and technical claims that portray the missile as one of Tehran's most capable, highlighting improvements in range, warhead mass, accuracy and re‑entry speed.
Iranian statements put the Khorramshahr-4's range at roughly 2,000 kilometres, a warhead weight of about 1,500 kilograms and a circular error probable (CEP) near 30 metres. The IRGC also claimed exo‑atmospheric speeds of 16 Mach and about 8 Mach on re‑entry, suggesting a profile that would compress interceptor reaction times and complicate existing air‑defence tactics.
The timing was deliberate. The display came a day before the United States and Iran were due to hold narrowly focused nuclear talks in Muscat, and IRGC commander Abdollah Javani framed the reveal as a message to Washington and other Western capitals: Iran's deterrent capabilities are non‑negotiable. Tehran has long treated its missile force as separate from the nuclear dossier and as a central instrument of regional leverage.
Technically, the Khorramshahr‑4 appears to be a medium‑range ballistic missile (MRBM) intended to strike strategic targets across the Middle East and beyond. From Iranian territory a 2,000‑kilometre radius reaches Israel, much of the Arabian Peninsula, eastern Mediterranean littoral states and parts of North Africa and southern Europe, which expands Tehran's targeting envelope and complicates strategic calculations for regional and extra‑regional actors.
For defenders, the combination of claimed high terminal velocity and improved accuracy matters more than symbolic spectacle. Increasing re‑entry speeds reduce the time available for interceptors such as Patriot, THAAD or Israel's Arrow system to detect, track and engage incoming warheads. A smaller CEP also increases the effectiveness of conventional payloads against hardened or point targets, while a heavy 1,500‑kilogram warhead offers flexibility in warhead design.
Beyond the technicalities, the demonstration feeds a familiar behavioural pattern: Tehran uses high‑visibility military events to signal resolve, deter adversaries and strengthen its negotiating position. By underscoring that missile capabilities lie outside the Muscat agenda, Iran's leadership is telegraphing that even if nuclear talks proceed, its broader strategic posture will be defended separately and robustly.
The immediate diplomatic consequence is a harder atmosphere for any confidence‑building between Tehran and Western capitals. While the Muscat talks were framed as limited to nuclear issues, missile advances raise questions about the scope of future negotiations and about how regional states will respond—politically, militarily and through procurement. The display therefore risks accelerating defensive measures by neighbors and allies, and could prompt reciprocal shows of force.
Ultimately, the publicisation of Khorramshahr‑4 is both capability announcement and negotiation tactic. It reinforces the IRGC's autonomy as a strategic actor inside Iran, complicates prospects for a broader security settlement in the region, and increases the stakes for missile‑defence planning across the Middle East and for Washington's posture toward Tehran.