Iran’s foreign minister, Araghchi, held his first domestic press conference since indirect talks between Tehran and Washington in Oman on February 6, using the platform to set expectations about the negotiation process and Tehran’s red lines. He emphasized that the indirect format itself is not an impediment to reaching an agreement, but warned that “unreasonable claims and unrealistic demands” from the other side could derail progress. Araghchi made clear that whether the dialogue continues will hinge on the attitude of the United States.
Iranian political analyst Sadadian described the February 6 talks as a small diplomatic opening amid heightened tensions, but cautioned that the option of military confrontation remains on the table and should not be discounted. He argued that the only realistic pathway toward an agreement is a careful, balanced and transparent negotiating framework designed to prevent misunderstandings or unilateral obstacles. That framework, he suggested, must include clear channels for verification and communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation.
Another analyst, Aldestani, reminded audiences that Tehran’s willingness to pursue diplomacy does not remove external threats to any deal; he singled out Israel’s role in the region as a potentially disruptive force. Aldestani urged Iranian vigilance, portraying Israel as a party that could seek to undermine de-escalation efforts through covert or overt actions that would complicate talks between Tehran and Washington.
The public briefing marks a notable moment: Iranian leadership is signaling a readiness to engage diplomatically while simultaneously managing domestic and regional audiences by highlighting the limits of compromise. Indirect negotiations with the United States reflect mutual caution—neither side appears willing to normalize direct talks yet both see value in reducing near-term risks. That posture keeps options open for both diplomacy and pressure.
For international observers, the comments matter because they define the fault lines that will determine whether this window of opportunity widens or snaps shut. The stated dependence on U.S. attitude points to the centrality of Washington’s strategic choices, internal politics and negotiating posture. At the same time, the repeated invocation of Israel as a spoiler underscores how third-party regional dynamics could override bi-lateral progress and rekindle broader conflict.
Looking ahead, a limited diplomatic track could produce incremental trust-building measures—mechanisms to avoid accidental escalation, confidence-building steps on sanctions relief or tacit understandings on proxy behavior—or it could collapse if either Washington or Tehran concludes the other’s demands are unacceptable. Israel’s potential intervention, domestic political pressures in both capitals, and the absence of direct talks all make the outcome uncertain and the risk of miscalculation persistent.