A fresh round of friction in Washington’s relationship with Beijing opened when a major U.S. arms package for Taiwan surfaced days after a stern Chinese warning. The Financial Times reported the Trump administration is preparing what it calls the largest-ever sale to Taipei, a package that could reach roughly $20 billion and would include Patriot missiles, advanced air-defence systems and two undisclosed weapons that analysts say may be offensive or asymmetric in nature.
If implemented, the proposed arms list would mark a shift from routine defensive replenishment toward a more aggressive effort to harden the island — a strategy U.S. officials have described publicly as making Taiwan a ‘‘porcupine’’ that is costly to attack. Beijing, which told Washington to ‘‘handle Taiwan arms sales prudently’’ in recent talks, views any enhancement of Taiwan’s offensive or layered defensive capabilities as a direct challenge to a core interest.
Practical obstacles complicate the U.S. calculus. Taiwan’s government is already stretched: a prior $11.1 billion package and a broader defence budget proposal remain entangled in local politics and legislative dispute, leaving payment deadlines looming and down payments uncertain. Domestic strife among Taiwan’s major parties, public fatigue over high defence spending amid sluggish economic conditions, and a fractious legislature mean the island may not immediately be able to shoulder another multibillion-dollar bill.
The proposal also needs to be read against a recent internal U.S. policy shift. The Trump team has set four new priorities for overseas arms sales: favour systems that pad American defence industry profits, prioritise buyers that pay their own way, sell first to partners in geopolitically important locations, and tighten post-sale monitoring of weapon end-use. The intent is neatly pragmatic: use sales to underwrite U.S. industry and reduce forward deployments while leveraging allies’ defence burdens.
That transactional logic reframes Taiwan as both a strategic asset and a customer. Timing and scale of arms transfers will now be instruments of broader U.S. China policy — ratcheting up when tensions suit Washington’s pressure strategy, and possibly frozen when diplomacy calls for calm. The arrangement also risks treating Taipei as a revenue source; if weapons purchases cannot be sustained, Taiwan could become increasingly dependent on U.S. maintenance, upgrades and political cover.
Geopolitical consequences are immediate. A high-profile sale would complicate any planned visit to China by former President Trump — already sensitive given both sides’ recent exchanges — and could harden Beijing’s response options. Conversely, if Washington chooses to delay approval until after a visit, it risks signalling that U.S. commitments are conditional on short-term diplomatic gain, undermining credibility with Taipei and other partners.
For Taiwan the choice is stark: increased lethality bought on American terms, with strings attached, or the political risk of resisting a sale whose financial burden the island can scarcely meet. For Washington the calculation is similarly fraught: arms sales can both bolster domestic industry and bind partners, but they also amplify strategic friction with Beijing and expose the limits of using tradeable instruments in matters tied to sovereign red lines.
The near-term outcome remains uncertain. The United States has not formally announced a new package, and Taipei’s ability to pay is in doubt. What is clear is that the episode crystallises a widening gap between U.S. transactional strategy — reshaping alliances through commerce and arms — and Beijing’s uncompromising stance on Taiwan, with Taipei caught in the middle.