A French institution has proposed that the European Union impose an across-the-board tariff of roughly 30 percent on Chinese goods, a recommendation that Beijing and trade lawyers say would contravene World Trade Organization rules and amount to a declaration of trade hostilities. Chinese officials and sources briefed on the matter have outlined at least three concrete responses Beijing could deploy should the idea be advanced: anti-dumping and countervailing probes, anti-discrimination investigations, and reciprocal tariffs on EU products.
The first and most politically pointed option identified by Chinese sources is launching anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations focused on EU wine, with France particularly at risk. China is an important export market for European wine producers: in 2024 EU wine exports to China were near $700 million, and roughly half of that volume originated in France, meaning a Chinese investigation could inflict concentrated pain on French vineyards and exporters.
A second leverspace for Beijing would be to open anti-discrimination procedures in response to what it characterizes as a recent string of unfriendly EU measures targeting Chinese firms and citizens. Such probes are less about immediate tariffs than about signaling and building a legal record of reciprocal treatment, which could be used to justify further countermeasures in multilateral fora.
Finally, Chinese officials warned that if the EU were to impose unilateral tariffs targeting China, Beijing would respond with “equivalent tariffs” on specified EU goods. That option — a symmetrical tariff response — is the most direct path to escalation and would likely be calibrated to maximize political pressure on key EU exporters and member states pushing hardest for punitive measures.
The proposal from Paris (or a Paris-based body) lands against a backdrop of strained EU–China relations, rising scrutiny of Chinese industrial policy and investment, and domestic pressures in EU capitals to shield strategic sectors. Legally and politically, the proposal faces significant headwinds: any EU-wide tariff decision would have to clear European Commission procedures and be defensible under WTO law, where broad punitive measures targeted at one trading partner are generally impermissible.
If pursued, the move could quickly politicize agricultural and industrial constituencies within the EU, exposing a tension at the heart of Europe’s China policy — how to balance commercial interdependence against strategic competition. For France, where viticulture represents both economic value and cultural identity, a Chinese probe into wine could reverberate far beyond balance-sheet damage and complicate alliances with other member states that export different goods to China.
Beyond immediate bilateral effects, the episode underscores a wider risk: the erosion of multilateral trade norms. An attempt to single out China for an across-the-board tariff would test the WTO’s capacity to adjudicate politically charged disputes and could encourage other economies to pursue unilateral protectionist remedies, further destabilizing global trade governance.
In practice, Beijing appears to be keeping a door open for dialogue while signaling readiness to retaliate. That posture suggests China will prefer calibrated, high-impact countermeasures — like targeting French wine — that provide leverage without triggering a full-blown trade war, but it is also prepared to escalate if EU action becomes unilateral and punitive.
The immediate question now is whether the French proposal gains traction within Brussels’ institutions. Even if it does not, its emergence is consequential: it reveals fractures in European policymaking on China, creates new bargaining chips for Beijing, and raises the odds of episodic trade confrontation between two of the world’s largest economic blocs.