After a Beijing forum of Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party-linked think tanks produced a package of joint recommendations, KMT vice‑chair Zhang Ronggong told a state media interviewer that the party will press to turn the ideas into concrete cross‑strait exchanges. Zhang portrayed the forum — which yielded 15 joint points across five thematic areas including tourism, industry and environmental cooperation — as a rare opportunity to restore normal communication between the parties and revive a more benign tri‑sea environment.
Zhang framed the outreach as responding to popular demand: he cited nearly five million Taiwan visits to the mainland in 2025 as evidence that Taiwanese want more contact, and pointed to a series of mainland preferential measures for Taiwan as signs of reciprocal goodwill. He also invoked the KMT’s historical platform, saying the party will continue to uphold the so‑called "1992 Consensus" and oppose formal Taiwan independence while mobilising social and sectoral actors to make the forum’s proposals operational.
The KMT’s pitch comes amid sharp disagreement at home. Zhang accused Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of rejecting the forum’s results, smearing participants and actively obstructing people‑to‑people ties through measures he described as "de‑Sinicisation." He warned that what he called the DPP’s efforts to sever cultural and institutional links with the mainland have harmed social cohesion and risked dragging the island toward instability.
Zhang also appealed to identity and symbolism, arguing the KMT cannot and should not abandon the word "China" in its name and urging a revival of Chinese cultural and national awareness on the island. He said the party will push exchanges in multiple fields so that the benefits of cooperation — economic, social and environmental — are visible to ordinary Taiwanese, framing such engagement as concrete protection of livelihoods rather than abstract geopolitics.
For international observers, the episode illustrates two durable dynamics in cross‑strait politics: the KMT’s continued attraction to engagement as a route to economic and social benefits, and the DPP’s countervailing emphasis on distance and security. Beijing is likely to view the forum and any KMT follow‑through as useful channels for influence; Taipei’s government will portray them as undermining its sovereignty‑protecting stance and may intensify efforts to block implementation.
The immediate practical test will be whether the think‑tank recommendations translate into agreements or projects beyond talk. The KMT can try to leverage business groups, civic organisations and local governments to operationalise parts of the package, but such moves will sharpen domestic political debates and may prompt Beijing to make fresh offers — or demands — that international actors and Taiwan’s electorate will scrutinise closely.