Avionics International reported on February 7 that Lockheed Martin has delivered a tranche of F-35 fighters to the U.S. Air Force since June 2025 without installed AN/APG-85 radars, leaving only the radar mounting hardware in place. Sources cited by the report say the installation method for the older AN/APG-81 and the newer AN/APG-85 differ in ways that prevent fitting the APG-81 as a stopgap, effectively leaving those aircraft without an operational primary radar.
If accurate, the revelation marks a notable degradation in immediate combat capability for the newest F-35s. While the Joint Strike Fighter carries a suite of sensors — including electro-optical targeting, distributed aperture systems, and electronic support measures — the airborne AESA radar remains central for long-range air-to-air detection, fire-control, and many precision ground-attack missions. Aircraft flying without that capability would be limited in mission sets or require compensating tactics and additional platform support.
The situation points to a cluster of industrial and programmatic pressures: radar-production bottlenecks, certification and integration delays for the AN/APG-85, and delivery schedules that may have prioritized airframe throughput over fully equipped systems. Shipping aircraft with placeholder hardware to meet contractual or fleet targets is not unprecedented in large, complex defence programs, but it carries costs in retrofit work, logistics and operational flexibility.
The F-35 programme has a long history of concurrency and incremental upgrades that have forced the U.S. military and allies to accept iterative fielding. Still, a delivery of fighters without their primary radar risks renewed scrutiny from Congress and defence customers abroad who rely on the platform for deterrence. For partner nations awaiting deliveries or upgrade kits, news that airframes may require depot-level work to reach full capability could complicate deployment timelines and political justifications for purchases.
Operationally, commanders could mitigate short-term gaps by reassigning fully-equipped jets, using other radar-equipped platforms for coverage, or employing tactics that exploit off-board sensors and networked targeting. All such measures, however, reduce operational tempo and raise costs. The logistical task of retrofitting radar units into delivered aircraft will put additional strain on depots, suppliers and budgets.
For Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman (the prime radar developer) and other contractors, the episode highlights the continuing challenge of synchronising complex subsystems across a global supply chain. The financial and reputational stakes are high: delayed or partial capability delivery invites questions about contract management, export schedules for allies, and congressional oversight of acquisition programmes.
U.S. defence officials have not publicly confirmed the Avionics International account. The most consequential next steps to watch are official DoD statements, orders to retrofit or restrict the affected jets to non-combat roles, and any moves by Congress to demand briefings or pause further deliveries until the radar issue is resolved.
Even if the problem proves temporary and fixable, the episode underlines a broader lesson about the fragility of modern defence supply chains and the limits of incremental fielding. For adversaries and allies alike, the optics of brand-new stealth fighters arriving without their primary sensors will be dissected as both a short-term operational issue and a longer-term indicator of industrial risk.