After a Beijing forum of Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) think‑tanks produced a package of joint proposals, KMT vice‑chair Zhang Rong‑gong told state media the party will press to normalise party‑to‑party communications and expand exchanges across multiple sectors. Zhang framed the effort as practical and urgent: more tourism, deeper industrial ties and cooperation on environmental sustainability, he said, would deliver tangible benefits to people in Taiwan and help stabilise the Taiwan Strait.
Zhang stressed the continuity of the KMT’s China identity and invoked the 1992 Consensus as the political foundation for cooperation, recalling the 2008–2016 period when more than 20 agreements were signed under that framework. He argued that the island’s mainstream public favours cross‑Strait contact—citing nearly five million trips by Taiwanese to the mainland in 2025—and welcomed Beijing’s targeted measures such as its “31” and “26” packages and agricultural and forestry policies aimed at Taiwan.
The recent forum, the first in a decade to bring together think‑tank figures, business representatives and academics from both sides in Beijing, produced 15 joint opinions across five areas, including tourism, industry and environmental cooperation. Zhang called the outcome "precious," and said the KMT will mobilise social forces to translate the joint proposals into concrete projects while maintaining opposition to Taiwanese independence.
Beijing’s interlocutors are not the only audience. Zhang used his interview to attack the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), accusing it of obstructing people‑to‑people exchanges and implementing policies of "de‑Sinification" that, he warned, push Taiwan toward instability. He painted the KMT’s stance as protective of everyday livelihoods and argued that preserving a Chinese cultural and national identity in Taiwan is both inevitable and essential for its safety and prosperity.
The exchange underscores an enduring tactical divide in Taipei politics. For the KMT, restoring institutionalised channels with Beijing is both a pragmatic route to economic opportunities and a political project to reclaim centre‑right voters drifting from the party. For the DPP, rapprochement of this kind risks normalising Beijing’s influence and undercutting strategies that emphasise Taiwanese sovereignty and distinct identity.
Internationally, renewed KMT advocacy for institutionalised party ties with Beijing will be watched closely in Washington and among regional democracies. Such bilateral party forums can act as backchannels that de‑escalate as well as mechanisms for influence; their reactivation matters for crisis management in the Taiwan Strait but also raises questions about transparency, business exposure and strategic dependencies.
Implementation will be the hard part. Past periods of expanded exchange brought clear economic gains but also produced political blowback in Taiwan when perceived as asymmetrical or insufficiently reciprocal. The KMT now faces the challenge of converting think‑tank agreements into projects that visibly improve livelihoods without triggering domestic alarms about Beijing leverage.
For Beijing, fostering non‑governmental and party‑level links advances a long‑standing strategy of building constituencies in Taiwan that favour closer ties. For Taipei’s electorate, the debate will hinge on whether concrete benefits—jobs, tourists, investment, environmental cooperation—outweigh worries about political autonomy and security in an era of heightened military pressure from the mainland.
In short, Zhang’s public pitch is a political test: can the KMT translate cross‑Strait engagement into a compelling policy narrative that reassures voters and withstands DPP counterattacks? The answer will shape Taipei’s domestic politics and the broader regional balance for the months and years ahead.