Images circulating online of a J‑15T carrier fighter carrying two sizeable underwing missiles have set off fresh debate about the trajectory of carrier warfare in the western Pacific. The jets appear to be the catapult‑launched J‑15T variant, a strengthened platform built for electromagnetic launch systems and longer‑range missions, and the warheads beneath the wings are widely judged by observers to be YJ‑15 supersonic anti‑ship missiles.
If those weapons are indeed YJ‑15s, the tactical implications are straightforward but significant: the combination of a J‑15T airframe with a long‑range anti‑ship missile pushes China’s carrier‑borne strike envelope toward the 2,000‑kilometre scale. The J‑15’s operational radius is commonly assessed at roughly 1,000–1,200 kilometres; a standoff missile with a range in excess of 1,200 kilometres extends the reach of a single sortie well beyond the aircraft’s organic range when the missile itself provides the terminal reach.
That development comes at the same moment the US Navy appears to be operationalizing another way to extend reach: the MQ‑25 Stingray carrier‑borne tanker. The MQ‑25’s sole but crucial role is aerial refuelling for carrier strike aircraft, notably the F‑35C. With regular refuelling, the F‑35C’s effective radius could climb from about 1,100 kilometres toward the 1,500–1,800‑kilometre band, allowing carrier strike groups to operate from greater stand‑off distances.
The arithmetic is simple and strategic consequences follow. If US carriers can launch strikes from nearly 1,800 kilometres away, they gain a buffer that complicates Chinese attempts to hold those carriers at risk using shorter‑range assets. Conversely, China’s apparent fielding of longer‑range ship‑killer missiles and catapult‑capable fighters signals an effort to push its own threat envelope outward so that carrier strike groups cannot shelter at safer stand‑off ranges with impunity.
But carrier contests are not single‑platform duels; they are system contests. China’s anti‑carrier posture rests on a constellation of capabilities: land‑based anti‑ship ballistic and cruise missiles, ship‑launched sensors and shooters, airborne early‑warning and strike coordination, and space and maritime domain awareness capabilities. A J‑15T able to launch long‑range anti‑ship missiles becomes another node in that mesh, not a silver bullet.
The United States, meanwhile, retains layered defensive advantages: Aegis‑equipped destroyers, carrier air wings with organic airborne warning systems, electronic warfare aircraft and robust logistics. The US carrier battle group’s defensive and evasive doctrine—combined with distributed lethality measures like increased submarine operations and dispersed missile shooters—means that even longer‑range Chinese strike assets will face a formidable kill chain to achieve decisive effects.
What the imagery most clearly signals is less an imminent change in the balance of power than an intensifying dynamic: both sides are extending their “reaches.” The US is leaning on aerial refuelling to enlarge the protective bubble of its carriers; China is integrating longer‑reach missiles into its fleet aviation and wider anti‑access/area denial architecture to shrink that bubble. The contest is moving from dogfights over carrier decks to who can see and strike fastest at longer distances.
For policymakers and regional states, that evolution matters because it raises the importance of surveillance, resilient command‑and‑control, and logistics. Longer‑range strike leads to greater emphasis on target acquisition networks, secure data links and the survivability of forward sensors. Whether these advances stabilize deterrence or sharpen the risk of miscalculation will hinge on how reliably each side can prosecute the entire kill chain—from detection to weapons delivery—under contestation.