Chinese coast guard vessels and outposts on multiple disputed features in the East and South China Seas marked the Lunar New Year with festival decorations, flag displays and filmed greetings, state-affiliated media reported. Crews stationed aboard the Zhu Jiajian patrol ship at the Diaoyu (Senkaku) waters delivered New Year messages against a backdrop of red banners and traditional couplets, even as rough seas underscored the operational environment. Similar scenes — crews lined up on decks with the five-star flag, spring couplets and New Year paintings — were shown at Huangyan (Scarborough) Reef, Ren'ai Reef, Xianbin Reef, Tiexian Reef and Zengmu Ansha (James Shoal), according to coverage carried on Sohu and the Global Times.
The imagery served a dual purpose: it is both a domestic morale-building exercise and a public demonstration of continuous maritime presence. For domestic audiences the pictures frame the coast guard as guardians who maintain normalcy and ritual at the nation's maritime periphery; for external observers they reinforce that China intends to keep contested features under steady administrative and law-enforcement control. The reporting emphasized that routine, “three-dimensional” management and patrols continue over the holiday, presenting an argument of ordinariness and permanence rather than exceptional escalation.
The choice of locations matters. The Diaoyu/Senkaku group is claimed by Tokyo and Beijing and lies at the centre of recurring Sino–Japanese maritime friction. Huangyan/Scarborough and several reefs named in the coverage are points of contention with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian claimants, while Zengmu Ansha (James Shoal) is well inside waters claimed by Malaysia. The coast guard, rather than the navy, has become Beijing’s primary instrument for day-to-day enforcement of maritime claims, blurring the line between civilian law enforcement and strategic signalling.
Viewed from the region, the seasonal festivities on decks are a low-cost, high-visibility means of reinforcing sovereignty claims without overt military escalation. Still, they contribute to the steady normalisation of Chinese administrative control over disputed maritime features, a process that can complicate crisis management and raise the baseline for diplomatic friction. Incidents can arise from close encounters between coast guard or civilian vessels belonging to rival claimants, and the optics of celebratory sovereignty messaging can harden domestic public expectations in each capital.
For international actors — from neighbouring capitals to the United States and partners conducting freedom-of-navigation operations — the tableau is both familiar and consequential. It signals that Beijing intends to maintain persistent law-enforcement presence even during symbolic national moments, reducing the window for surprise reversals and increasing the salience of any contestation. Expect more such mixes of ritual and operational presence around holidays, as Beijing leverages cultural symbolism to normalise and broadcast its maritime claims.