The U.S. Air Force’s Global Strike Command has said it is prepared to reload land‑based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and to restore the entire B‑52 fleet’s capacity to carry nuclear weapons if called upon. The comments, reported by The War Zone and reiterated by the command, came after the New START treaty between Washington and Moscow expired earlier this month with no replacement in place.
Both measures — reintroducing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ICBMs and returning the B‑52 bomber force to full nuclear certification — had been constrained by the bilateral arms control architecture that the treaty embodied. With the treaty no longer in force, U.S. statements stressing readiness are as much political signaling as they are operational declarations, aimed at deterring rivals and reassuring allies about American capability and resolve.
Re‑MIRVing land‑based missiles would materially change the strategic balance by increasing the number of warheads a single missile can deliver, complicating missile‑defense planning and heightening first‑strike incentives for potential adversaries. Likewise, restoring nuclear capability to the B‑52 fleet expands the flexibility and visible signaling options of the bomber leg of the triad, giving Washington a more overt and deployable nuclear posture in crises.
Practical and political constraints will slow any rapid change. Technical work to refit missiles, requalify warheads, retrain crews and reintegrate nuclear systems onto airframes requires funding, testing and certification. Domestic political debate in Washington, NATO consultation, and potential reciprocal steps by Russia would shape the speed and scale of any restitution of capabilities.
Diplomatically, the U.S. declaration escalates pressure on Moscow to respond and complicates future arms control. It also matters to Beijing: China was not party to New START and has been expanding its own nuclear forces, so U.S. moves to beef up deployed capability could be used by Beijing to justify further growth of its arsenal and delivery options.
The lapse of New START and the U.S. readiness to revert to more robust nuclear postures mark a setback for the restraints that defined post‑Cold War strategic stability. Rebuilding confidence and rules governing strategic weapons will be politically difficult in an era of great‑power competition, but without new limits the international system risks a durable acceleration of nuclear modernization and greater crisis instability.