Between January 2025 and February 5, 2026, disclosed financing into China’s integrated circuit industry reached ¥835 billion across 1,197 transactions, turning semiconductors into one of the country’s most capital‑intensive hard‑tech plays. The volume and frequency of deals mark a clear departure from the “many small cheques” pattern of earlier years, and underline how public and private investors are re‑orienting to support deeper domestic capabilities.
Average deal sizes during the period climbed to roughly ¥70 million, reflecting more targeted, strategic allocations rather than dispersed seed‑stage bets. Capital has migrated away from lower value‑add activities such as packaging and mid‑range chip design and into core bottlenecks: 14nm and below process development, AI compute chips and high‑end memory.
The concentration of capital is striking: of 20 large financing events tracked, 12 exceeded ¥1 billion each and together accounted for more than ¥500 billion — over 60% of the total disclosed funding. Heavyweights include 皖芯集成’s ¥9.55bn A round and a ¥9.4bn round for a leading domestic storage player; AI‑chip firms such as 曦望 (Sunrise), 昆仑芯 and others also secured multibillion‑yuan rounds, while Kunlunxin closed a $283m D2 round in December 2025.
Investment activity is not limited to chip design. Materials and equipment firms — for example 安徽晶镁, 晶恒电子 and 烁科晶体 — have attracted large strategic injections, reflecting recognition that upstream inputs and tooling are strategic chokepoints. New architectures and packaging advances, notably Chiplet approaches and flexible AI chips, are likewise drawing capital because they offer shorter, alternative paths to commercial applications in edge computing and wearables.
The investor mix combines state‑backed funds, industry capital and venture firms. Yida Capital led activity with 35 deals covering 32 companies, Shenzhen Capital Group recorded 22 deals and 中芯聚源 was involved in 19, while 中科创星 stayed focused on early hard‑tech startups. These institutions emphasize post‑investment operational support and long‑term cultivation, matching the lengthy R&D and industrialisation cycles of the sector.
Startups are increasingly graduating to later stages: a handful of companies completed four rounds in the period, and沐曦股份 became the only one among the most active names to reach an IPO after three funding rounds in 2025. That path — early hard‑tech financing, patient capital and eventual public exits — is emerging as the model market participants are trying to replicate across AI compute, storage and manufacturing plays.
For international observers the story is both familiar and consequential: China is deploying concentrated capital to close strategic gaps in semiconductor supply chains, prioritising firms and technologies that move it up the value chain. The scale of state and quasi‑state participation, the tilt toward big, later‑stage rounds, and the focus on core nodes and materials suggest Beijing’s industrial priorities are being met with market resources — a dynamic that will affect global competition, supply chains and technology diffusion in the years ahead.