China’s shipyards are operating through the Lunar New Year as work on a fourth carrier, designated 004, proceeds at an accelerated pace, according to Chinese coverage and imagery monitored by foreign observers. Satellite photos show frequent updates of the Dalian yard, where hull modular blocks have been brought together and the ship’s waterline appears unusually wide for a Chinese carrier.
The hull’s waterline is reported at roughly 43 metres—wider than the US Gerald R. Ford class at about 40.8 metres—leading analysts to estimate a displacement in the order of 110,000–120,000 tonnes. That scale, combined with internal layout cues visible in overhead imagery, has prompted assessments that 004 will be nuclear‑powered and significantly larger than China’s earlier conventionally powered carriers.
Chinese commentary on the vessel also highlights an aviation capability upgrade. The 004 is reported to carry four electromagnetic aircraft launchers (EMALS), one more than the domestic Fujian carrier and on par with the Ford class, using a mid‑voltage direct‑current architecture similar to Fujian’s. This configuration is presented as enabling higher sortie rates and continuous launch and recovery cycles, improving the carrier’s operational tempo.
Nuclear propulsion is being framed domestically as a step change for China’s carrier ambitions. Smaller pressurised water reactors adapted from coastal power stations, and a reported dual‑reactor layout for redundancy, would give a carrier group far greater endurance than conventionally fueled ships and reduce the frequency of at‑sea replenishment operations.
The pace of construction has invited direct comparisons with US carrier programmes. Chinese accounts argue that 004’s hull assembly now outstrips the multi‑year cadence that has characterised recent Ford‑class construction, an outcome attributed to a mature industrial base and lessons learned from previous carrier projects such as Fujian. Beijing is presenting an argument that timing is crucial: as some US carriers age and Ford‑class replacements face delays, a window is opening for China to expand its far‑sea naval footprint.
Politically and strategically, Chinese writers frame 004 not as a vanity platform but as a capability to “close” a strategic gap in the Western Pacific. A nuclear carrier battle group would be able to operate beyond the first island chain, posture off the second island chain and project presence into the Indian Ocean and the eastern Pacific. That, in turn, would complicate maritime lines of communication for opponents and raise the political and military costs of external intervention in regional disputes.
The technical claims embed both opportunities and limits. A nuclear‑powered carrier with EMALS and purpose‑built carrier fighters such as the J‑35 would increase operational reach, but carriers do not operate alone: credible power projection requires escort destroyers and frigates, logistics vessels, fleet‑tanker capacity, aerial refuelling, integrated command systems and robust anti‑submarine warfare. Building hulls rapidly is one thing; sustaining carrier strike groups and their training cycles is another.
For neighbours and great‑power competitors the implications are clear. Faster production of larger, nuclear‑powered carriers would accelerate naval competition, influence alliance planning in the region and force Washington and partners to reassess force posture and deterrence strategies. But technological maturation, operational experience and support infrastructure will determine whether 004 marks a transformational reversal of maritime balance or a significant, but incremental, expansion of China’s blue‑water capabilities.