A U.S. official told the Axios news site on Tuesday that Iran has offered to return to indirect talks with Washington in Geneva within two weeks, this time bearing a “detailed proposal” intended to bridge remaining differences between the two sides. The disclosure followed a second day of indirect negotiations in Geneva, which the official described as having made progress while leaving many details unresolved. Iranian foreign ministry statements after the meeting, attributed to Araghchi, echoed that positions still diverge but that the negotiating horizon is clearer than before.
Although sparse on specifics, the pledge to return with a detailed package signals a tactical shift: Tehran appears willing to crystallize its demands in writing rather than continue open-ended exploratory diplomacy. For Washington, a written Iranian proposal could help structure responses and accelerate the technical work required to settle verification, sequencing and sanctions-lifting formulas. Diplomats on both sides framed the session as incremental, not transformational — a reminder that the path from negotiations to implementation is littered with legal, technical and political hurdles.
These talks take place against the long shadow of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and its unraveling after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. Over the past several years Iran has expanded its nuclear activities and reduced cooperation with inspectors, creating a more complex negotiation than before. Any return to a formal understanding — or even a partial agreement — would have consequences far beyond Geneva: it would affect non‑proliferation calculations, regional security dynamics, and the rhythm of sanctions relief that can reshape Iran’s economy and export capacity, including oil markets.
What a “detailed proposal” might contain is increasingly the central question. Analysts expect it to address sequencing (which measures begin first: sanctions relief or nuclear restraints), verification mechanisms and limits on enrichment levels, and possibly political concessions on regional behavior or sanctions waivers for trading partners. Equally consequential will be how the United States and its partners — notably the EU and the IAEA — respond to any written text and whether Tehran’s demands are negotiable within acceptable margins for Washington and its regional allies.
The diplomatic process faces formidable domestic and regional constraints. In the United States, any deal will be scrutinised by Congress and opposed by powerful regional actors such as Israel and some Gulf states, which view substantial sanctions relief as dangerous if not accompanied by robust constraints on Iran’s regional activities. In Tehran, hardliners who benefitted politically from confrontation retain influence and have incentives to harden negotiating positions. The resulting credibility gap between what each capital can accept in public and what their negotiators can negotiate in private will dictate how quickly paper translates into implementation.
A return to talks with a written proposal creates a narrow political opening: if both sides can convert technical concessions into a phased, verifiable deal, the benefits would be tangible — restored limits on enrichment, predictable inspection routines and a channel for calibrated sanctions relief. Failure, however, risks entrenching the current stalemate and accelerating Iran’s nuclear capabilities, with attendant escalation risks for the region. Diplomacy, for now, is taking small, measured steps; whether they add up to a strategic detente remains uncertain.