Bloomberg cited data from Taiwan's defence ministry showing a sharp drop in day-to-day sorties by mainland aircraft around Taiwan in January 2026 — from an average of 15.6 per day over the Lunar New Year period to 5.4 per day in January. Several U.S. outlets read that fall as a sign the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is throttling back operations, perhaps even sending a political signal of de‑escalation. That interpretation is tempting, but it risks mistaking visibility for capability.
Days before the new year the PLA staged a large, multi‑service encirclement exercise around Taiwan. Naval and air assets operated in coordinated fashion and, crucially, state media and Chinese military briefings disclosed for the first time that J‑20 stealth fighters took part. The public appearance of the J‑20 in an exercise of that scale is more than a propaganda photo; it is an index of training sophistication and tactical evolution.
The J‑20 is built to exploit information advantage and to penetrate well‑defended airspaces while minimising detection. The aircraft’s operational logic is not high sortie counts but low‑observable, networked missions in concert with airborne early‑warning platforms, ground radars and other sensors. In practice, that means fewer, better‑protected missions can generate the same — or greater — tactical effect than larger numbers of conventional flights.
Taiwan’s publicly released monitoring footage and daily tallies did not show J‑20 tracks, a detail noted in Chinese commentary. If J‑20s were operating in contested airspace without being routinely detected or tracked, that points to real gaps in sensor coverage or to the deliberate adoption of tactics designed to limit optical and radar exposure. Stealth reduces X‑band radar signatures, and many legacy and even modern Western air‑defence systems are optimised against non‑stealth threats; low‑frequency radar can detect some stealth aircraft but often without the precision needed for engagement.
Beijing’s own broadcasts have reinforced the message: recent footage from a southern air brigade displayed large numbers of J‑20A fighters, signalling that the platform is moving beyond symbolic deployment to unit‑level normalisation. Mass‑fielding and regular training with J‑20s, especially when teamed with AWACS and integrated air‑defence and strike networks, alters the character of air operations in the Taiwan Strait.
The operational consequence is straightforward. A fall in reported sortie counts does not necessarily mean a reduction in coercive capability. It can reflect a deliberate shift toward higher‑quality, lower‑visibility operations that complicate adversary situational awareness and compress decision time for defenders. For Taipei and its partners, the result is not only a technical problem of sensors but a strategic problem of detection, attribution and timely response.
For Washington and Taipei the tactical ramifications matter politically and militarily. Deterrence built around persistent visibility — frequent patrols, publicised incursions and predictable patterns — becomes less effective if an adversary can achieve influence through selective, deniable and information‑driven maneuvers. The likely remedies are integrative: sensor fusion across bands, passive detection systems, augmented space and airborne surveillance, and more robust data‑sharing with allies to rebuild a comprehensive picture of the air domain.
Scepticism is still warranted. Media narratives on sortie totals can be shaped by differing counting methods and by information operations themselves. Still, the strategic trend is clear: stealth platforms, networked sensors and doctrinal shifts toward information‑centred warfare are changing the balance of power in ways that raw sortie numbers cannot capture. Policymakers who rely on visible activity as the sole metric of pressure risk being surprised by changes in quality, not quantity.