Recent satellite imagery updated in November 2025 exposes visible progress in Japan’s conversion of its Izumo-class “helicopter destroyers” into vessels capable of operating F-35B vertical/short takeoff and landing fighters. The images, taken over the Yokohama Isogo shipyard and reported by U.S. Newsweek, show the bow of JS Izumo reshaped from a trapezoid into a more rectangular profile — a modification Tokyo says is designed to facilitate F-35B operations and to harden the flight deck against jet exhaust.
The changes are part of a multi-stage retrofit that began in 2020 with deck markings and heat-resistant coatings; a second phase that started in 2024 focused on reshaping the bow and upgrading onboard maintenance facilities. Japan has reclassified the vessels from DDH (helicopter destroyer) to CVM (multi-purpose, carrier-capable vessel) and the defence ministry has signalled that Izumo and her sister ship Kaga should complete their conversions in fiscal years 2027 and 2028 respectively.
The technical rationale is straightforward: the F-35B’s short-takeoff/vertical-landing capability lets it operate from ships that lack US-style full-length carrier decks and catapults. Tokyo received the first tranche of its ordered F-35Bs in August last year and has deployed some to Nyutabaru air base, while international exercises have already seen F-35Bs land on the Izumo-class decks during Anglo-American-Japanese drills in August 2025.
For Tokyo and Washington the conversions enhance maritime interoperability across the first island chain, increasing options to project air power from Japanese-flagged platforms and to integrate with forward-deployed U.S. carrier and amphibious groups. U.S. commentary frames Japan as a key treaty partner whose upgraded platforms would bolster deterrence by enabling seamless operations with American carriers and amphibious assault ships in a potential contingency.
Beijing has responded with repeated diplomatic warnings and sharp rhetoric. Chinese officials and state media portray the conversions as evidence of Japan stepping beyond the defensive bounds of its postwar security posture, characterising the upgrades as steps toward “re-militarisation” and invoking historical sensitivities about Japanese militarism.
The practical effect of converting two ships is limited in scale but large in symbolism. Two carrier-capable decks do not equal a sovereign blue-water carrier fleet, but they provide Tokyo with a more flexible force posture, complicate Beijing’s operational calculations, and tighten operational ties with the U.S. Navy. These factors make the refits consequential for regional signalling even as their immediate combat impact remains modest.
Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are likely to treat the developments differently: the allies as force-multiplying and stabilising through deterrence, and China as escalatory and destabilising. The near-term implication is a higher tempo of surveillance, diplomacy and naval deployments as neighbours test boundaries and seek to reassure partners or domestic audiences.
Editor's Analysis
The Izumo conversions crystallise a broader strategic trend: Japan’s steady shift from strictly defensive platforms toward more expeditionary, interoperable capabilities that blur the line between self-defence and power projection. That trajectory is driven by Tokyo’s assessment of regional threats, closer operational integration with the United States, and domestic political moves to normalize Japan’s security role. In practice the upgrades will increase the operational reach and flexibility of U.S.-Japan maritime forces while also amplifying Chinese incentives to accelerate naval and air-force modernization, complicating crisis stability in East Asia. Policymakers in Tokyo and Washington will face a choice between managing these capabilities within tighter transparency and restraint frameworks or risking an arms-dynamics spiral that heightens miscalculation during crises.