A coalition of Arab and Muslim states has quietly drafted a framework aimed at persuading Washington and Tehran to sign a mutual non‑aggression agreement during talks scheduled in Muscat. Israeli media reported that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan have been involved in preparing the text, which would bind the United States and Iran — and their regional allies and proxies — to refrain from targeting one another.
The proposed framework, circulated ahead of the February 6 negotiating session, complements the enduring stalemate over Iran’s nuclear programme. The United States continues to demand a full cessation of uranium enrichment, while Tehran asserts an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. Iranian state media reported that Foreign Minister Alagheqi led a delegation to Muscat on February 5, and the White House confirmed that two senior US envoys — identified by Israeli outlets as Witkoff and Jared Kushner — were due to attend.
The initiative is the latest attempt by regional intermediaries, led by Oman, to dampen an escalation that flared in 2025. Last year saw multiple rounds of indirect US‑Iran talks brokered in Muscat; they collapsed after a June Israeli strike on Iranian soil triggered a “12‑day war” in which US forces struck Iranian nuclear facilities. That episode underscored how fragile indirect diplomacy remains when punctured by unilateral military action.
For Gulf capitals, the appeal of a non‑aggression compact is pragmatic: it promises a degree of predictable behaviour among major powers and their proxies, which would reduce the risk of miscalculation and protect trade and investment. Small and medium Arab states have repeatedly signalled that containment and managed competition are preferable to open conflict, particularly as regional economies remain vulnerable to supply‑chain shocks and oil‑market disruption.
Yet the proposed accord faces daunting political and technical obstacles. A pledge not to target the other party can be undermined by deniability and proxy warfare; defining which actors qualify as “allies” or “proxies” is inherently contentious. Verification mechanisms — and consequences for violations — would need to be far more robust than a diplomatic statement to change behaviour on the ground, and such mechanisms would require buy‑in from parties that have publicly declared maximalist positions.
Most politically fraught is Israel’s position. Jerusalem views Tehran’s nuclear advances and Iran’s regional posture as existential threats and is unlikely to accept any arrangement that constrains its freedom of action or leaves Iranian enrichment capabilities intact. That divergence could produce a security architecture in which major actors operate under different, overlapping agreements, increasing rather than decreasing the risk of localized confrontation.
If the Muscat talks produce even a limited pact, the immediate payoff would be reduced likelihood of direct US‑Iran strikes and short‑term de‑escalation. But without parallel progress on verification and the nuclear stand‑off, a non‑aggression pledge risks becoming a diplomatic sop — valuable for signalling intent but insufficient to settle the strategic competition that underlies the region’s instability. The coming days in Muscat will therefore be a barometer not only of US‑Iran relations but of the wider region’s capacity to manage conflict through collective diplomacy rather than force.