When Tehran publicly signalled willingness to negotiate over its nuclear programme this week, the conciliatory language sat alongside unmistakable displays of military readiness. President Masoud Pezeshkian told crowds on February 9 that Iran would only enter talks that respect international law, national sovereignty and mutual benefit, while the air force commander the next day announced the service was at the highest level of alert and ready to respond to any aggression.
The apparent contradiction is deliberate. Senior Iranian interlocutors and outside analysts portray Tehran’s posture as a two‑track strategy: engage in diplomacy to avoid open war, but make clear that core red lines on enrichment, missiles and regional influence are non‑negotiable. Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, travelled to Oman on February 10 to relay and receive messages through regional intermediaries, underscoring Tehran’s preference for indirect channels rather than direct talks with Washington.
Washington, however, has continued to apply unilateral pressure even after indirect talks resumed on February 6, complicating the diplomatic picture. Qin Tian, deputy director of the Middle East Institute at China’s China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues that the US is banking on a leverage shift it believes favourable after setbacks Iran suffered in the Israel–Iran flaring following the recent “12‑day war”; the Biden administration, he says, prefers to squeeze for maximal concessions rather than accepting incremental reciprocity.
Israel’s looming intervention in the diplomacy adds another layer of complexity. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s trip to Washington on February 11–12 is viewed in Tehran and by analysts as a concerted effort to align US policy with Israel’s higher red lines on missiles and regional influence. Israel wants tougher terms and keeps close communication with Washington; the risk is that American attempts to meet those demands could harden negotiations into an impasse.
Qin Tian outlines pragmatic steps that could revive talks: concentrate on the nuclear file as an early, achievable tranche; use confidence‑building measures to create breathing space by pausing new sanctions and naval deployments during negotiations; and broaden participation beyond regional brokers to include influential international actors who can mediate and guarantee compliance. These are incremental, reciprocal measures designed to bridge the current trust deficit.
The stakes extend beyond the negotiating table. If the United States insists on maximalist demands that Iran perceives as existential threats, the very pressure meant to secure concessions could provoke retaliatory escalation and collapse diplomacy. Conversely, a calibrated package of mutual, verifiable steps could yield an early nuclear agreement while leaving more contentious issues for later rounds — but that requires political flexibility Washington so far has been reluctant to demonstrate.
For outside powers, the Iranian approach is a test of whether diplomacy can be stabilised in an environment of competing alliances and asymmetric coercion. Oman’s intermediary role and the participation — or absence — of European, Russian and Chinese actors will shape whether the next phase becomes de‑escalatory diplomacy or a prelude to renewed confrontation. The immediate future will hinge on whether Washington can temper pressure with pragmatism and whether Tehran feels assured enough to trade limited concessions for durable relief.