The Munich Security Conference, once billed as a ritualised trans-Atlantic summit, opens this year under an unusually stark heading: the organisers’ 2026 report says the international order is “being destroyed.” Where last year’s briefing emphasised a turn to multipolarity, this year’s text replaces that notion with an alarmed diagnosis of “destructive politics” as the dominant mode of great-power interaction.
That rhetorical change is more than semantic. The report and preparatory commentary frame a Munich that is less a forum for Western coordination than a venue where Europe confronts the unraveling of the post‑Cold War security architecture and the changing reliability of its American partner. Munich’s chair has compared this year’s meeting to a bicycle repair shop — an evocative image for a gathering tasked with rebuilding trans‑Atlantic trust at a moment when that trust is frayed.
European disquiet has multiple sources. Chinese and European participants describe three overlapping anxieties: the future of the liberal international order, the trajectories of Europe‑US relations and Europe’s own capacity to act independently. Those anxieties, conference planners say, are driving a shift in agenda and tone: sessions that formerly assumed trans‑Atlantic alignment are now structured around how Europe can adapt to a more uncertain global balance.
Practicalities have also moved to the centre of discussion. Unlike prior years when Ukraine and other geopolitical flashpoints dominated, this Munich has broadened its focus into technology, energy, industrial policy and supply‑chain resilience. European organisers have invited a more diverse set of Chinese participants — academics and experts on digital governance, climate and artificial intelligence — reflecting a desire to engage China on concrete problem‑solving rather than framing it purely as a strategic adversary. The conference report mentions China more than eighty times, signalling both attention and opportunity.
European commentators note a visible recalibration of posture towards both Washington and Beijing. Some European voices are tempering earlier competitive narratives about China, increasingly distinguishing between problems driven by trans‑Atlantic dynamics and those arising from China’s rise. At the same time, a reportedly lower level of US official representation has underscored for many Europeans the need to consider strategic autonomy and hedging between the two powers.
The immediate consequence will be a more transactional, issue‑oriented diplomacy in Munich: talks about chips, critical minerals and energy interdependence that seek pragmatic cooperation on shared vulnerabilities. Yet the deeper consequence is geopolitical. If European governments proceed from a posture of independent problem‑solving, they may accelerate institutional and industrial moves that reshape alliances, trade rules and tech governance — in ways that could either stabilise the system or produce new fault lines.
This Munich is therefore a barometer of whether the West can reconfigure its partnerships for resilience, or whether the ‘destructive’ dynamics the report warns about will harden. For observers outside Europe, the shift matters because European choices on trade, tech and defence will influence how China, the United States and other powers manage competition and cooperation in the coming years.