At the opening of the 62nd Munich Security Conference on 13 February, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz used the platform to press a familiar but now more urgent theme: Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy. In a gathering that draws presidents, prime ministers, ministers and defence chiefs, Merz’s address framed autonomy as necessary for Europe to defend its interests amid simultaneous challenges from Russia’s war in Ukraine, economic coercion, and intensifying U.S.–China rivalry.
The Munich conference has become the annual barometer of elite thinking on security and geopolitics. This year’s conversations centred on whether Europe can rely on uncertain U.S. domestic politics and an assertive China, and what that means for defence, supply chains and critical technologies. European leaders at the conference signalled a shift from rhetorical solidarity toward concrete demands for capability, resilience and industrial capacity within the European Union.
For Germany, Merz’s intervention reflects a broader domestic repositioning. Having taken office after a period of cautious foreign policy, his government appears intent on accelerating defence investment, deepening industrial cooperation with European partners, and reducing strategic dependencies — particularly in energy and high-tech supply chains. Berlin’s emphasis on autonomy is aimed at both reassuring allies of its commitment to European security and pushing the EU toward more operational independence.
The push for autonomy is not a simple pivot away from the United States. European officials at Munich repeatedly stressed that strategic autonomy should complement, not replace, the transatlantic alliance. Yet the concept risks friction: differing threat perceptions among EU members, the practical limits of procurement and defence planning, and Washington’s instinctive preference for leadership leave space for misalignment. How Europe balances cooperation with the United States while building credible independent capabilities will be the central policy test of the next five years.
The implications extend beyond NATO politics. A more autonomous Europe could pursue a more independent China policy — combining tougher stances on market access and technology protection with selective cooperation — and limit Moscow’s leverage by reducing energy and trade vulnerabilities. The path to autonomy, however, requires sustained funding, industrial coordination, and political solidarity that have been inconsistent across the bloc. The Munich debates suggest growing momentum, but significant gaps remain between ambition and the hard work of delivery.