Britain’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, has said the government will accelerate its planned rise in defence spending to reach 3% of gross domestic product, framing the move as part of a broader push to restore European deterrence. Speaking after a speech at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, Starmer argued that Europe must “be ready to fight” and that London’s defence plans will be shaped by cooperation with “like‑minded countries, especially European states.”
The pledge builds on a previous UK timetable that set defence outlays at 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% by 2029. By signalling a faster trajectory, Starmer is attempting to reassure NATO partners and domestic voters that Britain will remain a leading military power in an era of heightened competition with Russia and strategic rivalry with China.
Starmer’s rhetoric also carried a pointed post‑Brexit message: he warned that there is no British security without Europe and no European security without Britain. The line is designed to reset debates about the UK’s role on the Continent, asserting that despite seven years of strained ties since Brexit, practical security cooperation must continue and intensify.
Reaching 3% of GDP sooner will pose real trade‑offs. Defence budgets can prop up procurement programmes and the defence industrial base, but they cannot instantly produce trained personnel, new platforms or secure long delivery chains. The biggest constraint will be execution: ministers must convert headline commitments into realistic procurement schedules, recruitment drives and multinational interoperability plans.
For NATO, an accelerated UK spending path would be a visible signal of burden‑sharing and resolve. It may encourage slower‑moving European states to up their own defence efforts, aligning with Starmer’s “sleeping giant” formulation for the Continent’s latent capacity. Yet the effectiveness of higher spending will hinge on whether European defence efforts are coordinated through NATO, bilateral arrangements, or EU frameworks — an area where political friction still exists.
Domestically, the announcement serves several political purposes. It allows a Labour government to fend off charges of softness on security from opponents, bolster ties with the defence industry, and appeal to voters who prioritise national defence. At the same time it forces Labour into a conversation about fiscal priorities: accelerating defence spending will compete with pressures on health, education and public services in a constrained fiscal environment.
Looking ahead, the crucial test will be detail. Ministers must present clear timelines for force structure increases, recruitment targets, and procurement milestones; they must also explain how faster spending will be coordinated with European partners and NATO allies. Without such specifics, the pledge risks becoming another strategic aspiration rather than a deliverable shift in Britain’s military posture.
